Real-time closed-loop simulation and upset evaluation of control systems in harsh electromagnetic environments by Belcastro, Celeste M.
N90:23069
R_l-Time Closed-Loop Simulation and Upset Evaluation of
Control Systems in Harsh Electromagnetic Environments
Celeste M. Belcastro
NASA Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia 23665
ABSTRACT
Digital control systems for applications such as aircraft avionics and multibody
systems must maintain adequate control integrity in adverse as well as nominal operating
conditions. For example, control systems for advanced aircraft, and especially those with
relaxed static stability, will be critical to flight and will, therefore, have very high reliability
specifications which must be met regardless of operating conditions. In addition,
multibody systems such as robotic manipulators performing critical functions must have
control systems capable of robust performance in any operating environment in order to
complete the assigned task reliably. Severe operating conditions for electronic control
systems can result from electromagnetic disturbances caused by lightning, high energy
radio frequency (HERF) transmitters, and nuclear electromagnetic pulses (NEMP). For
this reason, techniques must be developed to evaluate the integrity of the control system in
adverse operating environments. The most difficult and illusive perturbations to computer-
based control systems that can be caused by an electromagnetic environment (EME) are
functional error modes that involve no component damage. These error modes are
collectively known as "upset", can occur simultaneously in all of the channels of a
redundant control system, and are software dependent. Upset studies performed to date
have not addressed the assessment of fault tolerant systems and do not involve the
evaluation of a control system operating in a closed-loop with the plant. This paper
presents a methodology for performing a real-time simulation of the closed-loop dynamics
of a fault tolerant control system with a simulated plant operating in an electromagnetically
harsh environment. In particular, the paper discusses considerations for performing upset
tests on the controller. Some of these considerations are the generation and coupling of
analog signals representative of electromagnetic disturbances to a control system under test,
analog data acquisition, and digital data acquisition from fault tolerant systems. In
addition, the paper presents a case study of an upset test methodology for a fault tolerant
electronic aircraft engine control system.
I. Introduction
Advanced aircraft designs reduce aerodynamic drag via relaxed static stability and,
therefore, control systems that are critical to the flight of the aircraft are required to maintain
stability. In addition, fuel efficiency is greatly improved in advanced designs by using
light-weight nonmetallic (composite) aircraft structures, rather than the metal ones currently
in use. The trend in avionics technology is the implementation of control laws on digital
computers that are interfaced to the sensors and control surfaces of the aircraft. Since
digital computers are highly susceptible to transient electrical signals, the use of digital
controls compounds the problem already incurred through the use of composite structures
which do not provide the electrical shielding inherent in metal. As the function of the
control system becomes more flight critical and the use of composite materials becomes
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more widespread, the problem of verifying the integrity of the control in adverse, as well as
nominal, operating environments becomes a key issue in the development of a control
system. The use of digital computers to implement control laws is also evident in other
areas of application. For example, in multibody systems such as robotic manipulators,
control laws are implemented on digital computers. Performance considerations of these
systems when operating in electromagnetically harsh environments are also of concern.
Performance evaluation techniques presented in this paper are applicable to the assessment
of any digital control system, regardless of the specific application. For simplicity, this
paper will concentrate on techniques for evaluating the performance of avionic control
systems in adverse operating environments.
One particularly harsh operating environment results from the presence of
electromagnetic fields caused by sources such as lightning, high energy radio frequency
(HERF) transmitters, and nuclear electromagnetic pulses (NEMP). As shown in Fig. 1,
sources such as lightning, HERF, and NEMP generate electromagnetic fields outside of the
aircraft which are dependent on the aircraft's geometry and structural material. These
exterior electromagnetic fields penetrate the aircraft by l_hjoints, seams, and
apertures so that interior electromagnetic fields are p_sent: The inte_fig_r_fi_eld:s cause analog
electrical transients to be induced on the aircraft's wiring, and these signals can propagate
to the onboard electronic equipment despite shielding and protective devices such as filters
and surge suppressors. There are two types of effects to digital computer systems that can
be caused by transient electrical signals. The first is actual component damage that re_h_s
repair or replacement of the equipment. The second type of effect to a digital system is
characterized by functional error modes collectively known as _pset" wlu_h invoqvve_
component damage. In the case of upset, normal operation can be restoreo to the system
by corrective action such as resetting/reloading the software or by an internal recovery
mechanism, such as an automatic rollback to a system state just prior to the disturbance.
The subject of effective internal upset recovery mechanisms is an0i-hei'-cUi'rent topic for
research. See reference [1] for a more detailed account of the electromagnetic threa_t to
advanced digital avionics system_ ....
To date, there are no comprehensive guidelines or criteria for performingtegtg_
analyses on digital control systems to evaluate upset susceptibility or verify control integrity
in electromagnetically adverse operating environments. Therefore, the objective of this
research is to develop a methodology whereby a digital computer-based control system can
be evaluated for upset susceptibility as well as control integrity when subjected to analog
transient electrical signals like those that would be induced by an electromagnetic source.
In particular, the electromagnetic source under consideration in this research is lightning.
This paper discusses various issues in the design and implementation of upset tests which
can be performed in the laboratory on a candidate fault tolerant control system during a real-
time simulation of the closed-loop dynamics of the controller and plant operating in an
adverse electromagnetic environment. A case study is described involving the upset test
design of a full-authority electronic engine controller (EEC).
II. Upset Test Design for Fault Tolerant Control Systems
Most upset studies conducted to date have involved general-purpose systen_
executing a generic application code during testing [2] - [6]. One upset study involved the
evaluation of an Inertial Navigation System that was subjected to transient signals like those
that could result from NEMP [7]. Since none of these studies involved a control system
that has closed-loop dynamics with a plant, it is desirable that an upset methodology be
formulated for such a system. The general laboratory test configuration for the upset
evaluation of a control system is shown in Fig. 2. As shown in the figure, the test
configuration involves two control units - the unit under test and an unperturbed reference
unit. The controller under test is permrt_l by transient signals like those that could be
induced by lightning. Each controller is interfaced to a simulation (hardware or software)
of theplant in suchamannerasto representtheclosed-loopdynamicsof thesystem.The
operationof thetwoplantsimulationsarecomparedduringtestssothatcasesin which
acceptablecontrolis notmaintainedby thefaultedcontrollercanbeflaggedin realtime.
Dataobtainedfrom thecontrollersduringtestsarestoredfor postprocessingandanalysis.
An alternativeto havingafaultedandreferencecontrolleris tohaveonecontrollerwhich
wouldberunwith theplantsimulationwithoutfaultsfor aperiodof timein a so-called
"goldrun". Unfaulteddatawouldberecordedfrom thecontrolleraswell asthenominal
operatingparametersof theplant. Then,theplantparameterdataobtainedduringfaulted
runswouldbecomparedaftertestingto thenominaldataandadeterminationmade
regardingthecontrolintegrityof thefaultedcontroller. Sinceuseof thetwo controllers
wouldsavea stepin dataprocessing,it is advantageousto usethisconfigurationif two
prototypecontrollersareavailable.
A. Generationof Analog Transients in the Laboratory
The waveform, shown in Fig. 3, that is most representative of those that occur on
internal aircraft wiring due to lightning is a 1 - 50 MHz damped sinusoid which decreases
in amplitude 50 - 75 % after four cycles [8]. This waveforrn can be generated by a
capacitor discharge circuit with light damping [9]. However, use of a simple RLC circuit is
awkward because components must be changed in order to generate key frequencies in the
1 - 50 MHz range. Three pulse generators have been designed to fulfdl the electromagnetic
test requirements of the Royal Aerospace Establishment [10]. One pulse generator
produces damped sinusoidal waveforms from 2 - 30 MHz, one is a fixed-frequency 100
kHz generator, and the third produces two waveforms for ground voltage lightning effects
simulation.
The most versatile way to generate the transient signal, and the technique presented
here, is a polynomial waveform synthesizer which generates the waveform that
corresponds to the entered equation. The output of the waveform generator can then be
scaled to the proper amplitude via a wideband power amplifier. In this way, transient
signals can be easily generated that cover a frequency range of interest and represent the
induced effects of any electromagnetic source.
B. Coupling Analog Transients to the Controller Under Test
The mechanism for coupling analog signals into the digital controller must be such
that the controller is not loaded down by mismatched impedance. In addition, the coupling
mechanism must be representative of that which would occur in the natural operating
environment, depicted in Fig. 1. The two most widely used coupling techniques are
resistive and inductive coupling. An advantage to resistive coupling is that no special
equipment is needed. In addition, it is very easy to inject transient signals into integrated
circuit pins as well as printed circuit board test points. The coupling method which best
satisfies the above criteria is to induce voltage into a cable or cable bundle using a ferrite
coupling transformer that can be clamped around the cable. Details of performing such
tests are given in [11] and [12].
Another consideration is whether the transient signal injection should be
synchronized with the operation of the controller or whether the transient should be injected
asynchronously. If the transient is injected synchronously, it must be introduced into the
controller during each operational state of the processor. Since the number of states in a
digital control system is very large, the required amount of testing for this approach is
impractical. For this reason, asynchronous injection of a statistically significant number of
transient signals is more advantageous. In addition, asynchronously injected transients can
occur during the transition between states and, therefore, more realistically represent the
threat that could occur in a natural environment.
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C. Controller Monitoring Strategies
In single channel systems, upset modes can be fairly easily detected using comparison
monitoring techniques on a test unit and reference unit executing identical software and
operating in bit synchronism. Any time the data bus, address bus, or control lines of the
test unit differ from those of the reference unit, data can be recorded and analyzed. In this
way, data is only recorded for wansient injections from which errors have occurred. (It
was established in [2] and [3] that the occurrence and type of upset depends on the relative
timing of the transient signal injection and the state of the processor. For this reason, upset
does not occur each time the transient signal enters the system.) An advantage to this
technique is that, since error-free data is not recorded, the amount of required data
reduction is reduced.
Conversely, upset detection in fault tolerant systems is much more complex. Fault
tolerant controllers usually employ one of two basic redundancy strategies - voting or
primary/secondary channels. Comparison monitoring techniques cannot be used in upset
testing of fault tolerant systems since reconfigurafions in the test unit wouldcause
miscomparisons to be generated without faulty operation being present. For these types of
systems, upset detection criteria must be carefully selected since they effec_vely define
upset for the test unit.
D. Data Acquisition
It is recommended that both analog and digital data be recorded during upset tests.
The analog data to be recorded are the waveforms induced in the digital controller. In this
way, various threshold characteristics of transient signals that cause upset can be
determined. Norms such as peak absolute amplitude, maximum absolute rate of rise, peak
absolute impulse, rectified impulse, and root action integral have been suggested in the
literature for measuring NEMP stress waveform attributes [13]. These norms were used in
an NEMP upset study and found to be inadequate [7]. Therefore, appropriate frequency-
dependent norms for characterizing upset stress attributes of electromagnetically induced
transient signals from sources such as lightning, HERF, and NEMP remains a topic for
further research.
Digital data to be acquired from the Controller s_houldinciude the calculated control
commands obtained from the data bus, the internal status word of the processor, as well as
the address bus and appropriate processor control lines. Range checks can be used to
determine if the calculated control commands are appropriate for the control regime in
progress. Commands that would be acceptable in one control mode could be devastating in
another, so calculated command data can only be evaluated in the context of the application.
The internal status word of the processor should be monitored for the results of self tests,
parity checks, and other fault tolerance strategies that might be present in the digital
controller under test. Monitoring the results of the processor's own self-heMth evaluation
can signal the beginning of a functional error mode or upset. Upset modes that occur
without indication from self-health checks may suggest self tests that could be effective
against upset in future processor designs. Monitoring address bus activity establishes
cases in which the processor accesses invalid or nonexistent memory space. When this
happens, the processor executes whatever data word it finds there as a valid instruction and
often never returns to the correct memory space or correct operation until the system is
reinitialized. Monitoring the control lines of the processor establishes the operational mode
of the processor and, therefore, enables the experimenter to determine if invalid memory
space data has been decoded as an instruction. Exact details of the digital data acquisition
are dependent on the controller under test.
In redundant systems with voting, the digital data described above must be obtained
from all processors as well as the voter, and reconfiguration data must also be obtained. In
redundant systems with primary/secondary channels, the digital data described above as
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well astheflagsandsignalsrelatedto whichchannelis in primarycontrolandwhich is
commandingthevariouscontrolloopsmustberecorded.Digital datarecordedfrom
multiproeessorsystems houldbe time-stampedsothatconcurrentactivitiesof processors
in thesystemcanbecorrelatedfor postprocessing.
IlL CaseStudy:UpsetTestSet-upfor aFaultTolerantEngineController
Theupsettestmethodologyfor digital controllers described in Section 11 is planned
to be applied to an electronic engine control (EEC) unit. The EEC is a commercial
controller manufactured by the Hamilton Standard Division of United Technologies, which
provides electronic controls for Pratt & Whitney engines. The EEC is a full-authority
engine controller and is a dual-channel system which operates with a primary/secondary
channel strategy. A block diagram of the EEC is shown in Fig. 4. As shown in the
diagram, the EEC receives signals from the airframe, actuator position sensors, and engine
parameter sensors. The inputs to each channel are also available to the other channel so that
the best inputs can be selected by both channels. The control commands are calculated with
the selected inputs and one output is selected to be sent to the actuators. In addition to its
control function, the EEC performs a comprehensive self-health evaluation during
background activity.
The EEC to be used in the test set-up is a modified version of the commercial unit.
Modifications to the EEC include access to the data bus, address bus, and control lines of
the microprocessors of each channel to enable measurements in the laboratory. In addition,
nominal flight parameter values for eight different flight conditions are stored in Read Only
Memory (ROM) as well as the nominal values for all but three of the engine parameters.
The eight flight conditions to be used during tests are take-off, cruise, acceleration,
deceleration, reverse, idle, partial power, and climb. The variable inputs to the EEC are
Throttle Resolver Angle (TRA), Inlet Air Temperature (T2), and Engine Speed (NI).
These inputs can be varied for the eight flight cases during testing, and will be initially
generated as shown in Fig. 5. The TRA input will be generated using a resolver, T2 will
be generated using a resistive potentiometer, and N1 will be generated using a pulse
generator. Therefore, for initial tests, the EEC will be running open-loop and the calculated
commands will be stored in memory. In the next testing phase, these three loops will be
closed so that the dynamics of the controller and plant can be simulated in real time.
Subsequent plans are to modify the EEC so that additional variable inputs are provided.
During testing, each processor in both the test unit and reference unit will be
monitored for activity on the data bus, address bus, and control lines. Upset for the EEC
will initially be defined as :
(i) Selected parameter values for N1, T2, TRA is out of range for
n cycles;
(ii) Calculated control commands are out of range for the given
flight mode for n cycles;
(iii) Invalid memory space is accessed for n cycles.
Indiction of the occurrence of any of these activities on the data bus, address bus, and
control lines of the processors in the test unit will result in the data being recorded for that
test run. As testing proceeds, the list of activities defining upset for the EEC will be
expanded as necessary.
A block diagram of the upset test instrumentation is shown in Fig. 6. The damped
sinusoidal waveform of Fig. 3 is generated by a polynomial waveform synthesizer and
amplified by a wideband power amplifier with a maximum output power of i000 W and a
frequency range of 10 kHz - 220 MHz. This analog signal is inductively coupled into the
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EECandtheinducedwaveformisrecordedonawaveformdigitizer/analyzeronwhich
someanalysis,suchasFFF andenergy/powerspectrum,canbeperformeddirectly.
Digital datafrom theEECisrecordedonadigital analysissystemwith 240input linesthat
cancapturedatafrom fourmicroprocessorssimultaneouslywith timecorrelation.Datacan
bedisplayedon thedigital analysissystemin timing,state,or graphicalformat. Analog
anddigital datafromthewaveformdigitizer/recorderandthedigital analysissystemis then
transferredvia IEEE488busto apersonalcomputer,which isusedfor someof the
analysis,displayof data,andtransmissionto aVAX 11/'750for furtheranalysis.
IV. FutureWork
Upsettestswill beperformedon theEECin bothanopen-loopandaclosed-loop
configurationin ordertocompareupsetcharacteristicsrelativetoeachof thesemodes.The
analogsignalsinducedon theEECwill berecordedandappropriatenormswill bedefined
whichcharacterizeupsetstressthresholds.Digital datarecordedfrom theEECwill be
scrutinizedfor selectedinputsthatareoutof range,calculatedcommandswhichare
inappropriatefor thegivenflight regime,accessesto invalidmemoryspace,andproblems
whichareflaggedby self-healthtests.
Theobjectivesof initial testingaretodemonstratethemethodology,establishan
upsetdatabasefor afault tolerantcontrolsystem,definecharacteristicinducedwaveform
thresholdnormsfor upsetstress,andobtainstatisticalinformationaboutupsetin afault
tolerantcontroller.Longrangegoalsincludethedevelopmentof on-lineupsetdetection
andcorrectionstrategies,upsettolerantdesigntechniques,anupsetassessmenttool for
dataanalysis,andanupsetreliabilityestimationprocedure.
SUMMARY .......
An upsettestmethodologyisbeingdevelopedfor fault tolerantcontrolsystemsand
will beappliedto theupsettestdesignof anelectronicenginecontroller. Themethodology
involvesgeneratingelectricaltransientsl'flcethosethatwouldoccurnattirallyin a lightning
environment,couplingthesesignalsinto acontrollerundertest,andcollectingbothanalog
anddigital datafrom thecontrollerduringtests.Theprimaryobjectiveof thismethodology
is to developassessmenttechniquesfor fault tolerantcontrolsystemsoperatingin
electromagneticallyharshenvironmentsdueto lightning,HERF,andNEMP. Theprimary
motivationfor thedevelopmentof assessmenttechniquesis thetrendin theaeronautics
industrytowardsflight-critical digital controlsystemsonboardadvancedcompositeaircraft.
However,techniquesandconsiderationspresentedin thispaperareapplicableto digital
controlsystemsfor anyapplication.
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